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Skip to main content. Log In Sign Up. Student Self-governance in Hungary in the New Millennium: Our thematic issue consists of articles that discuss geographical and environmental questions of the cultural history of Hungary.

Our intellectual journey in time and space begins with the Hungar- ian prehistory and nakacsi with 19th-century horse races.

Bakacsi Gyula – – Gazdaságtudomány, üzlet

This question becomes even more fascinat- ing, sezrvezeti we consider the situation of Tihany Abbey: The history of the Ottoman Empire and that of the Hungarian Kingdom are strongly connected.

Finally, we arrive in the 19th century: We bakaczi you will enjoy reading it our issue: The degree and character of yyula that the countries faced during the transition depended on the nature of the pathways taken. In this paper I distinguish three major trajectories various countries followed: The neo-liberal model of transition implied i a market-consistent privatization of the corporate sector, ii far reaching deregulation of all aspects of economic life, iii the dismantling of the prematurely born welfare state and a iv western style, multi-party, competitive political system.

Each pathway I describe in this paper is an ideal type. There are substantial over-time and cross-country variations and there are historic and geographic differences even within each trajectory.

Bakacsi Gyula Szervezeti Magatartás És Vezetés Jegyzet

So there are many shades and phases within neo-liberalism: Poland is quite different from Hungary, the Czech Republic from Slovakia. It opened up to international capital much slower than the other Central European countries, while state owned enterprises were downsized which led to a sharp drop in employment, many firms remained in the possession of their management and workers. Nevertheless, the similarities among the East Central European countries in terms of their transformational trajectory are more pronounced than their differences, if we contrast them with alternative post-communist regimes1.

If we used the criteria above, the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would also qualify to be neo-liberal, but for historic reasons 1 Usually 7 countries are labeled this way: I present data from all of these countries. They seem to shift slowly, but steadily from the neo-patrimonial to a neo-liberal order, but are not quite there yet by the end of the second decade of transition. On the neo-liberal trajectory, countries faced the challenges of five socio-economic crises: The first two crises came during the early stages of the transition – the last three occurred close to each other by the mid or second half of the second decade.

Recession and Recovery The first phase of neo-liberal transformation can be characterized by a sharp initial drop in the economic output which reached the pre-transition levels during the mid to the late s.

First I try to establish the common trends in the whole region and next I will comment briefly on the cross-national differences. The Big Picture is pretty clear. While commentators anticipated that the transition from redistribution to market economy would have its costs, the costs in real life were far greater than predicted by theory. The drop in GDP was about 20 percent for the Central European neo-liberal regimes it was even greater in the Baltic States — there it was close to 50 percent — Dragutinovic- Mitrovic and Ivancev,p.

The economy started to drop in It bottomed out in and recovered to the levels by The third crisis took place as transitional economies tried to adapt their welfare system to the logic of the market economy which overlapped in part with the global financial crisis.

In this paper I add a fifth crisis, namely the crisis of the European periphery. In Central Europe, there was an economy of shortage also in terms of labour: Hence, transition to markets, privatization of firms and hardening of budget constraints dramatically reduced the demand for labour. This was particularly dramatic in agriculture. As the collective farms were turned into privately owned or at least privately managed businesses, former coop members lost their jobs and income opportunities and the emergent usually quite large farms operated with a fraction of the labour the coops used.

But the trend was similar in other sectors of the economy as well. Nevertheless, the demand for labour was also reduced due to the restructuring of the composition of the economy by sectors. Socialism was a strategy of accelerated industrializa- tion, which often followed the patterns of the 19th century economy. The unemployment rate is a poor measure of the problem, it peaks percent inbut the proportion of those who were employed before the fall of communism and were left out or forced out of work after communism had collapsed is certainly substantially higher.

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But many who lost their jobs involuntarily and had no realistic chance to obtain gainful employment again, hence stopped trying, took early retirement, collected disability pension, survive on the underground economy and therefore do not appear on unemployment statistics. The retirement system was already poorly constructed under socialism it was not an endowed system, de facto it was a pay-as-you-go system which in a rapidly ageing population – most of the late socialist countries had low fertility and an aging population – was already unsustainable.

A better measure of the labour market condition is therefore the labour force par- ticipation rate. I present data from four out of the seven countries Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia where there was a substantial drop in labour force participation rate: Slovenia is an outlier: People, especially men in their late 40s or 50s not only lost their previously well-paid jobs, but became permanently unemployed, since they could not transfer or covert their earlier skills into useable ones in a post-industrial capitalist economy.

With the exception of the Czech Republic, life expectancy declined during the first years of the transition and mortality increased especially among mid- dle aged men. Unlike in neo-patrimonial regimes where this proved to be one of the worst and lasting disaster in demographic history Stuckler, King and McKee,p.

The first decade of transition in these regimes was also accompanied by a jump in poverty rates. According to EBRD estimates, the proportion of the population under the poverty line increased almost tenfold in the region between and from 1.

InI collected data with the only retrospective data on poverty going back to and my findings were similar. The same figures for the other countries: Although the social and economic performance of neo-liberal regimes were disappointing, the social and economic costs of the transition was far worse than predicted even by the more pessimistic economists; in comparison with the neo-patrimonial regimes, the first decade of neo-liberalism is an undisputable success story.

The decline of the economy was less steep, the 5 This are the estimates of for Hungary by Maria Augusztinovics,pp. The Central European countries by the end of their first decade were all liberal democracies, their system may not have been as liberal, as democratic and as stable as one would have hoped for during the glorious month ofbut was closer to what democrats are striving at in neo-patrimonial regimes or in Chinese late communism.

ZS 13 Data from www.

Hungary16 GDP annual growth 1 -4 -3 -1 3 2 1 5 5 Unemployment rate 1 1 8 9 12 11 10 10 9 8 Labor force participation rate17 Na 55 54 55 52 51 49 49 48 48 Population below poverty line Na Na Na Na 8.

ZS 18 Data from www.

[PDF] Bakacsi Gyula Szervezeti Magatartás És Vezetés Jegyzet – Free Download PDF

ZS 23 Data from www. ZS 32 Data from www.

Social Exclusion and Poverty in Slovenia. Slovenia and the Czech Republic were far the most affluent nations. Slovenia had a double advantage: The Czech Republic on the other hand did not have the reform traditions of Hungary and Poland, but it had a better pre-communist record in democratic governance, so after all the vyula performance of the Czech Republic was no surprise. The differences between Hungary and Poland deserve more attention, These differences were not that striking during the first decade, but became more pronounced in the second phase of the transformation which was the cause of so much Angst among Hungarian intellectuals during the past few yearsbut already by the late s it seemed that Poland was doing some- thing better than Hungary.

Magatatrs should have anticipated Hungary to lead the pack. And in some respects Hungary remained on the cutting edges during the early years of post-communism. By EBRD measures Hungary was among the most aggressively liberalizing countries and having followed closely the Chicago School cook-book, it was rewarded for its eminent behaviour by being far the most attractive country for foreign investors.

Nevertheless the recession in Poland lasted only for two years, in Hungary it did drag on for four. According to the scarce data available to us, inequality and poverty grew faster in Poland than in Hungary — a big puzzle: Most likely there are numerous reasons — not only economic, but also social, demographic and political – why the two countries began to diverge despite their similarities and are on sharply different economic growth trajectories by the second decade of the 21st cen- tury.


Those who like to blame maagatarts parties or governments for poor economic performance might be troubled: While in the Czech Republic the democratic system was reasonably consolidated and the former communist parties never regained power, the far right extremist forces were negligible, politics in Hungary and Poland fluctuated wildly between successor par- ties and right-wing or even extremely right-wing parties in government, each blaming the other for the economic problems.

In Poland in —, the finance minister Balcerowicz introduced what was at that time seen as brutal monetary liberalization strategy which almost instantly liberal- ized the banking sector, implemented a new tax system and a currency reform. As a result, the Polish economy was in free fall, magwtarts exploded bybut the economy bottomed out within a year. On the other balacsi, the Poles moved with the privatization of the corporate sector much more cautiously, hence monetary liberalization preceded property reform.

In Hungary, the sequence of reforms was different. The Hungarian government moved more carefully with the monetary reform, but pushed ahead with privatization of the corporate sector, opening up the country to multi-national capital.

Slovenia is usually cited as the strongest case against mass privatization szfrvezeti gradualism in the transformation of property relations —and gyua did indeed rather well during the first decade of the transformation and started to have some problems during the last years of the second decade.

The second unanticipated cross-national difference in the neo-liberal region is the better performance of Slovakia than the Czech Republic. Already during the first decade, the received wisdom proved to be wrong. While the economic recession was indeed even more severe in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic, and especially the Slovaks did much worse in terms of unemployment than the Czechs by the second half of the decade, the Czech Republic slid into its second recession, but the Slovak economy took of and it happened under a political regime — of Vladimir Meciar, prime minister —98 — which in its ideology was rather neo-patrimonial.

Hence, there are no easy answers what the sources of success or failure are. The Second Phase of Neo-liberal Transition — Take-off gyuula Stagnation42 The second decade of neo-liberal transformation is entirely a success story: At least one qualification is needed to this rather excessively optimistic statement. During the first years of the second decade — well before the Global Financial Crisis hit — economic growth tended to be moderated, the previously prominent reduction of sovereign debt at least in some countries was reversed.

This met political resistance, political mobilization, such as strikes or votes for right-wing populist parties. While the first transitional crisis was the result of adjustment of the economy to market imperatives, now the second emerges as a 42 Data in this section are from Index Mundi World Bank unless indicated otherwise.

The Czechs and the Poles managed to dig themselves out from the downward spiral of the early years, to regain better growth rates and limit budget deficits. The Bulgarians, Romanians and Slovaks had a ball until the Global Crisis came; they were swallowing the capital which found the Czech, Hungarian and Polish economies as becoming far too expensive and they managed to implement cutbacks and keep budget deficits and sovereign debt under control.

The Global Financial Crisis hit almost all neo-liberal regimes hard only Poland managed to remain in positive fields even inRomania and Hungary fared the worst, but there was a drop in GDP output and increase of unemployment similar to the rest of EU or the advanced economies of the world in the other CEE countries.

Although a recovery was generally under way soon again inthe region was hit by the euro-crisis, which is anticipated to slow the growth below 3 percent.

According to EBRD estimates,43 Hungary was already in recession again by the middle ofthe Czech Republic may slide into szervezetii and only Poland and Slovakia may grow for more than 2 percent. Bulgaria GDP annual growth 2.

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ZS 48 Data are from www. ZS 50 Data are from www. Romania GDP annual growth ZS 54 Data are from www.