ADAMS, ROBERT. “Theories of actuality.”. Noûs, Vol. 8 (), pp. – CrossRef. CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI. “Individuation and. In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects and nestedmodal operators require stipulation of nested possible worlds.
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For the remainder of this essay, then, we assume that some actualist theory of worlds is viable and therefore concentrate our energies solely on the problems that arise in connection possible individuals rather than possible worlds. Hence, they argue, there are innumerably many possible worlds other than our own, which exist just as much as ours does. Antony Eagle – – In Toby Handfield ed.
We can now define several critical notions: I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality Author s: Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter. Chad Carmichael – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 2: Christopher Menzel – – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
In putting forward this theory, the actualist takes herself to be replacing an obscure distinction between two modes of being — possible existence and actual existence — with an intelligible distinction.
Actualism and Possible Worlds
User Account Sign in. This leaves open the question, of course, of what an actually existing “way the world could be” is ; and on this question actualists are divided. Classical, Early, and Medieval Prose and Writers: Since it is sorlds complete, only one such state of affairs could actually obtain; all the others would differ from the actual world in various large or small ways. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Actualism and Possible Worlds : Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality – oi
Alan McMichael – – Philosophical Review 92 1: But they argue that the possibilist goes wrong in taking this as a sign that there exist other worlds that are just like ours, except for the fact that we are not actually in them. Where propositions are said to be true or false, states of affairs are said to obtain or not. Therefore, as Lewis is happy to admit, there is a world where someone named Sherlock Holmes lived at b Baker Street in Victorian times, there is another world where pigs fly, and there is even another world where both Sherlock Holmes exists and pigs fly.
However, again, we will not pursue this question here. Alvin Plantinga University of Notre Dame. A possible world is a state of affairs that could be such that it includes all and only states of affairs that obtain. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists — an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.
In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses. From an actualist point of view, such as Adams’possible worlds are nothing more than fictions created within the actual world. If a state of affairs is possible, then it really obtains, it physically occurs in at least one world.
Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists — an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.
Phillip Bricker – – Philosophical Studies 52 3: Find it on Scholar.
This step is, therefore, consistent with Thesis A. Publications Pages Publications Pages. Mirror Sites View this site from another server: Show More Show Less.
This latter point about the actualist theory of worlds brings us to the second step of their treatment of modality, namely, how to analyze ordinary modal claims that seem to require such possible individuals as possible million carat diamonds, possible talking donkeys, possible Aliens, etc.
Christopher Menzel – – Synthese 85 3: Furthermore, in putting forward this theory, the actualist has not invoked any objects which have such modal properties as being a possible million carat diamond, being a possible talking donkey, being a possible Alien, etc. For any state of affairs s and world ws obtains at w just in case w includes s. In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses.
Consider the statement ” Sherlock Holmes exists. In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism — i. Alvin Plantinga Contributor Webpage Publisher: Added to PP index Total downloads 10, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 24 18, of 2, How can I increase my downloads?
Search my Subject Specializations: Retrieved from ” https: Other possible worlds exist in exactly the same sense as the actual world; they are simply spatio-temporally unrelated to our world, and to each other.
Richard Montague – – In Richmond H. Importantly, note that a state of affairs can exist without obtaining, just as a proposition can exist without being true. A world w is actual just in case w obtains. As poxsible example of actualistically acceptable abstract worlds, we draw chiefly upon Plantinga’s account.
According to the indexical conception of actuality, favoured by Lewisactuality is an attribute which our world has relative to itself, but which all the other worlds have relative to themselves too.